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I. Introduction
In ‡ation targeting (IT) has shown increasing promise as the new generation of monetary policy framework ever since New Zealand …rst adopted it in 1990. Burgeoning research is recording the practice and reviewing the performance of IT central banks ("ITers" henceforth) . The work by Neumann and Hagen (2002) , Truman (2003) , IMF (2005) , Vega and Winkelried (2005) , among others, painted more or less a success story for IT. 1 In fact, no country has ever dropped IT after adoption, and an increasing number of countries are embarking on IT, despite the ongoing debate and reservations of certain academics. 2 With the increasing popularity of IT, a lowest common denominator, if no consensus, of what constitutes IT is forging among central bankers and academics (c.f., section 2). But no international best practice has emerged. In fact, the " ‡exibility" of IT as a monetary policy framework is often cited as a primary reason for its resilience and viability (e.g., Roger and Stone, 2005; Svensson, 1999) . 3 It is well recognized in recent literature that IT is multi-faceted strategy and set of procedures and the practices vary across central banks. Economists have not yet agreed on how to label this diversity. Carare and Stone (2006) , for example, divided IT regimes into three subcategories: full- ‡edged IT, implicit IT, and IT lite. They classi…ed the U.S., the European Central Bank (ECB), and Japan as implicit ITers. Truman (2003) , in contrast, dubbed the three big economies "G-3", a special group that are not ITers and yet achieve well-anchored in ‡ation expectations. A closer reading into central bank laws and publications reveals that divergence is the norm rather than exception. This is true even among the more homogenous group of so-called full- ‡edged ITers. For instance, such countries as Armenia, Colombia, Greece, Iceland, and South Korea write IT explicitly in their central bank acts; many others, like Brazil, the UK, and Israel, have published numerous government decrees regarding IT but fall short of legislating the regime. Thus, there is a de jure and de facto distinction among ITers. There are other important di¤erences in terms of target design, reaction horizon, transparency, and accountability. These di¤erences become more apparent with implicit ITers and central banks having gone through disin ‡ation whilst instituting IT.
While recognizing the vast diversity of IT practices, empirical research continues to treat ITers as homogeneous. In ‡ation targeting is recorded as a binary variable, i.e., either one or zero, in virtually all econometric work comparing ITers with non-ITers -name just a few, the empirical work by Ball and Sheridan (2005) , Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) , and IMF (2005) . Much as announcing an in ‡ation target does not make a central bank an ITer, there are institutional arrangements and attributes that matter more for in ‡ation performance than does the tag of IT. Yet no research has made an e¤ort to ascertain and quantify, if possible, the impact of such institutional underpinnings.
This research attempts to …ll the void by posing and answering key questions of both theoretical and operational relevance to current and potential ITers. First, do di¤erent institutional arrangements and attributes matter for the performance of an IT regime? What are the most important ones? Second, how ‡exible can ‡exible in ‡ation targeting be in terms of target design, and, is there an optimal degree of ‡exibility or transparency? Our contribution is twofold. First, it contributes to the growing literature of IT evaluation by treating IT as a continuous variable on important dimensions such as institutional arrangements, target design, and transparency and accountability. It does so by …rst establishing a framework of constructing an IT index based on an emerging consensus on what constitutes IT. Second, and more importantly, it sheds light on vital policy debate for potential ITers eager to imitate and emulate, e.g., whether to make the regime as explicit as possible in terms of institutional arrangements; whether to make the regime as ‡exible as possible in deciding on a point target or a target range and choosing between a relatively short and long target horizon; and whether in principle to aim to have as much transparency as possible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 …rst provides a brief literature review and discusses the framework of constructing IT indices on related and yet distinct dimensions of the regime. Section 3 tests empirically the validity of the newly minted indices and presents a horse race between ‡exibility and transparency among all IT regimes. Section 4 provides robustness checks using factor analysis, subsampling, and instrumental variable estimation. We conclude in Section 5 and o¤er some policy re ‡ections. Tables, …gures, and a brief theoretical review of factor analysis are provided in the appendices.
II. Literature Review and the Construction of an IT Index
A. What Constitutes In ‡ation Targeting?
Even after almost two decades of in ‡ation targeting, confusion persists on exactly how to de…ne the term. Kuttner (2004) noted that there are two alternative ways, not mutually exclusive, to think about IT: the …rst is in terms of the observed characteristics of the policy framework, and the second is in terms of policy rule. The second approach, spearheaded primarily by Svensson (1997 Svensson ( , 1999 , treats IT as an optimal policy rule derived from a "reasonably explicit objective function." Woodford (2004) and Walsh (2002) also described IT in terms of optimal targeting rules. 4 Bernanke et al., (1999) , in the …rst cross-country review of IT practices, advocated that IT is best described as a "framework" rather than a "rule." In a similar vein, Truman (2003) observed that "in ‡ation targeting in practice involves both more and less than a reaction function characterizing a monetary policy regime". This research takes the practical angle and views IT as a monetary policy framework. Even from the pure practical perspective, however, prominent writers di¤er in what constitutes IT: Mishkin (2000) posited that in ‡ation targeting encompasses …ve main elements: (i) the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for in ‡ation; (ii) an institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals are subordinated; (iii) an information-inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just monetary aggregates or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy instruments; (iv) increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy through communication with the public and the markets about the plans, objectives, and decisions of the monetary authorities; and (v) increased accountability of the central bank for attaining its in ‡ation objectives. Truman (2003) summarized four principal elements of IT: (1) price stability as the goal of monetary policy; (2) a numerical target or sequence of targets to make the framework operational; (3) a time horizon over which the target or the targets are to be met, and 4) an associated approach for evaluating whether the objective or objectives have been achieved. Svensson (1997 Svensson ( , 1999 originally emphasized the role of in ‡ation forecasting. Today, for Svensson (2007a) , the essential elements of IT are three-fold : (a) an announced numerical in ‡ation target; (b) an implementation of monetary policy that gives a major role to an in ‡ation forecast and has been called "in ‡ation-forecast targeting"; (c) and a high degree of transparency and accountability.
It is worth pointing out that the point of deviation of Svensson's de…nition is that a single or hierarchical mandate is no longer a necessary condition for IT. Svensson's related work (1997 Svensson's related work ( , 1999 Svensson's related work ( , 2001 ) also showed in detail the consistency of in ‡ation targeting with a dual mandate.
Despite the aforementioned divergence in de…ning the term IT, a lowest common denominator, if not a consensus, exists for recognized ITers. IT as a monetary policy regime must have a well-de…ned in ‡ation target, be it a point or a range, with institutional arrangements to support its achievement, and a high degree of transparency and accountability. The centerpiece of IT is to establish and maintain well-anchored in ‡ation expectations via central bank transparency and accountability.
the former referring to rules derived from explicit optimization problems and the latter often linked with the Taylor rule or the in ‡ation forecast-based (IFB) rule. The second distinction is between targeting and instrument rules. Targeting rules are speci…ed entirely in terms of the targets of monetary policy (in ‡ation and output); instrument rules are de…ned in terms of the optimal setting of the monetary policy instrument, typically the short-term interest rate under the central bank's control.
B. A Framework for Constructing an IT Index
Our proposed framework of constructing an in ‡ation targeting index consists of three related and yet distinct dimensions: target design, transparency and accountability, and institutional arrangements. Each of the three dimensions has a corresponding subindex, namely, ‡exibility, transparency, and explicitness, which in turn is built upon various components of the IT regime.
The subindex of ‡exibility is built on four variables, each coded on a scale of 0 (least ‡exible) to 1 (most ‡exible).
Clarity of target: point targeter vs. range targeter, and the width of the range A critical issue in coding numerical targets is whether the level of in ‡ation target itself matters. The level of numerical targets for point targeters or the mid-point for range targeters often changes over time (see Table 1 for details). It is especially the case for countries going through disin ‡ation phases. They often have a declining path of in ‡ation targets and sometimes specify only upper but not lower bounds on in ‡ation. 5 The ‡exibility of in ‡ation targeting is not so much about the level of target itself as it is about the latitude within which central banks can operate. We thus focus on the range of the target. For countries where no range is speci…ed, we look at the range within which central banks are exempt from reporting requirements. 6 Table 1 records that the target range in practice can be as wide as 5.0 percent (minus and plus 2.5 for Brazil between 2003 and 2006) or as narrow as 0 for a pure point targeter (e.g., Finland and Norway). A larger in ‡ation target range will likely allow central banks more ‡exibility in taking other objectives into account. We hence code 1 for countries with the widest target range indicating most ‡exibility; 0 for a strict point target with least ‡exibility; and x=5 for countries in between with a target range of width x. The theory of IT would suggest that the clearer the target, the more concrete the commitment and the better anchored the in ‡ation expectations. Thus, we expect to …nd a positive correlation between the clarity of target and the performance of in ‡ation dynamics.
Horizon to achieve the in ‡ation target 5 For the case of specifying only the upper bound, it is debatable whether this gives the central bank more or less ‡exibility. On the one hand, any point below the upper bound is "on target" and thus appears to give ITers more latitude. On the other hand, a clear-cut upper bound implies that central banks must by all means bring in ‡ation under control, indicating a stringent condition. I tend to follow the latter interpretation when coding numerical targets.
6 Roger and Stone (2005) reported that the Bank of England since 2004 has not had an explicit target range but deviations of more than 1 percent from target requires an o¢ cial explanation.
Publicly declared target horizons of ITers vary from annual to multi year/medium term and from business cycle to inde…nite/long term (see Table 1 ). The reason for such diversity may be that the optimal choice of target horizon is economy-speci…c and subject to factors such as the underlying transmission mechanism of monetary policy, the magnitude and persistence of shocks, and not least the preference of central bankers. 7 Batini and Nelson (2001) de…ned the optimal policy horizon (OPH) as the time at which it is least costly, for a given loss function, to bring in ‡ation back to target after a shock. 8 This de…nition is the result of standard optimization practice along the lines of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Svensson (1997 Svensson ( , 1999 . More intuitively, the OPH is the horizon-analogue of the optimal speed of disin ‡ation -the optimal time required for the dissipation of a shock. Operationally, the OPH is given by the number of periods after a shock when in ‡ation is back on target under an optimal rule.
A longer target horizon, ceteris paribus, gives the central bank more ‡exibility in taking other policy objectives into account without subordinating the in ‡ation objective. We thus code 1 for inde…nite horizon, indicating maximal ‡exibility; 0.67 for business cycle; 0.33 for multi year; and 0 for annual horizon. An annual horizon is often adopted during disin ‡ation phases.
Reporting requirements of target breach and escape clauses 9 If there is no formal reporting requirement for missing the target range, central banks have more leeway to take into consideration other objectives, such as employment and …nancial stability. We code 1 for no target breach reporting requirement and 0 for the nine ITers (Brazil, Canada, Iceland, Israel, New Zealand, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, and the UK) that require formal public explanations for missing the target.
The existence of escape clauses and its potential invoking may also provide central banks with extra ‡exibility. Escape clauses spell out in advance circumstances under which central banks are exonerated from reporting a breach of the target. Such circumstances include large adverse supply shocks and big adjustments in administered or regulated prices and often dictate a temporary accommodation of in ‡ation disturbances. Setting the in ‡ation target in terms of a measure of core in ‡ation, as was pointed out by Roger and Stone (2005) , often serves as an implicit escape clause. But only a few countries set their targets in terms of core in ‡ation, and only Canada, Czech Republic, New Zealand, and South Africa have had explicit escape clauses (see Table 2 for a detailed list). We code 1 if there are escape clauses, explicit or implicit, and 0 otherwise. 7 Using a small estimated forward-looking model of the euro area economy, Smets (2003) found that the optimal policy horizon became longer the greater the weight on other objectives such as minimizing the output gap and interest rate variability; it became shorter the higher the degree of "forward-lookingness" in the economy and the greater the slope of the Phillips curve.
8 Batini and Nelson (2001) also used an alternative de…nition dubbed "optimal feedback horizon (OFH)". In contrast to "optimal policy horizon", which is a result of standard optimization, OFH views targeting expected future in ‡ation simply as setting the policy instrument in response to deviations of future in ‡ation from target. In other words, under OFH the in ‡ation forecast at some speci…c horizon is a key input into policy-makers'decisions. 9 These two items are also important in holding central banks accountable.
The expected sign of ‡exibility on the mean and variance of in ‡ation is not unequivocal. On the one hand, if in ‡ation stability is already achieved and credibility well-established, central banks can a¤ord more ambiguity in target clarity and slower adjustment to bring in ‡ation back to target. On the other hand, a steadfast point target and a shorter (annual) time horizon to achieve it are often adopted during the disin ‡ation stage. The reason might be that the central bank needs to signal its resolve and establish credibility by reducing ambiguity and increasing accountability. Put simply, there is a potential endogeneity issue between ‡exibility and credibility (more on this later).
As Svensson (1999) noted, the speed of monetary policy instrument adjustment depends on the degree of ‡exibility. Flexible IT implies that shocks that drive in ‡ation away from the target should revert at a pace that does not harm real activity too severely. Too fast an adjustment is equivalent to strict IT, which is likely in situations whereby the central bank needs to gain or strengthen credibility. With a fast adjustment, undue real volatility might emerge, whereas in the slow adjustment case either credibility is strong enough that the central bank can reap some bene…ts of ‡exibility or the nominal anchor is lost and in ‡ation falls to the expectation trap.
Transparency and Accountability (IT 2 -Transparency)
There is no consensus on a de…nition of central bank transparency, let alone its measurement. Posen (2002) , for example, presented six practical views of central bank transparency ranging from "reassurance" to "irrelevance." Geraats (2002) and Eij¢ nger and Geraats (2006) provided a taxonomy to analyze the transparency of monetary policy along …ve distinct aspects: political, economic, procedural, policy, and operational transparency. Although very useful, the …ve-way categorization may not be altogether …tting here. We feel that certain aspects, especially political transparency, stray beyond what most people understand by the term "transparency." In asking such questions as whether or not there is an explicit numerical target, it in essence applies to a target design issue. In fact, in applying the taxonomy to 37 central banks Crowe and Meade (2008) found that only economic and operational transparency are signi…cant and bear the expected negative sign. Our proposed transparency index for ITers focuses on the forecasting aspects of an IT regime as well as central bank website coverage. Like the ‡exibility index, it is built on four variables, each coded on a scale of 0 (least transparent) to 1 (most transparent).
Number of in ‡ation reports, quantitative in ‡ation forecasts, and publication of fan charts If, as was argued by Blinder (2004) , Woodford (2004) and Svensson and Woodford (2005) , modern central banking is about managing expectations, the importance of in ‡ation forecasting cannot be over-emphasized. All ITers now publish in ‡ation reports (see Table  4 ). But the number (x) and frequency of in ‡ation reports varies from 0 to 4 a year, which is coded accordingly as x=4. Other forwardlooking practices such as publication of quantitative forecasts and fan charts are equally important. They are recorded and coded as taking a binary value of 0 or 1.
Central bank website coverage
Central bank websites play an increasingly important role in central bank communications. Heenan, Peter, and Roger (2006) documented central bank website coverage of seven items, namely, IT framework, target details, transmission mechanism, policy instruments, decision-making, policy calendar, and links to materials. We code 1 if a central bank website covers all seven items, and x=7 if it covers only x items.
Reporting the interest rate path Svensson (2007b) The expected sign on transparency is negative; i.e., the more transparent ITers are, the more superior their performance on managing in ‡ation expectations and thus reducing the mean, variance, and persistence of in ‡ation. There is nonetheless a possibility of too much transparency, but it is doubtful that any central bank has passed that threshold yet. One approach is to record 1 for a single/hierarchical mandate and 0 for a dual/multiple mandate. Another is to follow Cukierman et al., (1992) and have a …ner classi…cation on central bank objectives. 11 Using the former approach and citing relevant articles from central bank laws, I found in a separate and yet related paper (Miao, 2007) that the mandate does matter for the performance and conduct of monetary policy. To the extent that a binary classi…cation captures the essential di¤erence among di¤erent types of central bank mandates, we adopt it in this paper as well.
Exchange rate arrangement: free ‡oating to hard peg (Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2004) 1 0 For whether in principle there can be too much central bank transparency, see, among others, Mishkin (2004) , "Can central bank transparency go too far?" 1 1 They assigned a numerical value of 1 if price stability is the major or only objective in the charter, and the central bank has the …nal word in case of con ‡ict with other government objectives; 0.8 if price stability is the only objective; 0.6 when price stability is one goal, with other compatible objectives, such as a stable banking system; 0.4 if price stability is one goal, with potentially con ‡ict ing objectives, such as full employment; 0.20 if no objectives stated in the bank charter; and 0 if stated objectives do not indude price stability.
Adoption of an IT regime entails subordinating exchange rate goals to the objective of price stability. We code 1 for completely free ‡oating, 0.5 for managed ‡oating, and 0 for a peg. But full- ‡edged ITers have converged in this aspect as well.
Central bank independence (instrument independence) and monetary policy decision-making mechanism 12 A disproportionate amount of weight should be given to instrument independence given the fact that ITers are converging on aspects such as establishing monetary policy committees (MPCs), setting a single/hierarchical mandate, and intervening less and less in foreign exchange markets. To the extent that the Cukierman index (Cukierman et al., 1992 (Cukierman et al., , 2002 already covers important aspects of the central bank mandate and decision-making mechanism, we use the central bank independence index as a proxy for IT 3 . We obtain central bank independence data from Simon and Guillen (2005) The expected sign of the subindex of explicitness is negative. The more explicit ITers become, the stronger the institutional commitment to it, and the better their performance in terms of reduction in the mean, variance, and persistence of in ‡ation.
We could have added an additional subindex ranking the credibility of di¤erent IT regimes. It could potentially cover items such as whether in ‡ation expectations are well-anchored or not, whether an ITer has a good track record of meeting targets, and whether a central bank possesses necessary IT infrastructure, e.g., research and forecast capacity. But some of the items appear to be performance criteria themselves. Credibility, even if treated separately from in ‡ation performance, clearly hinges upon attributes that are already included in the subindices of ‡exibility, transparency and explicitness.
Each of the three subindices takes the form of IT i = P ! i I i , where ! i is the subjective and mostly equal weight for di¤erent attributes. The only exception is that two of the four elements in the ‡exibility subindex, namely reporting requirements and escape clauses, receive only half the weights assigned to the other two. The reason is based on the observation that they are seldom invoked in practice. Notice that each individual attribute I i is coded on a scale of 0 to 1. As such, each subindex IT i is normalized to 1 and is comparable across di¤erent dimensions. In view of the uncertain impact of target design ( ‡exibility) on in ‡ation dynamics, it may be more meaningful to separate the index of ‡exibility from that of transparency and central bank independence.
III. Data and Econometric Analysis
The main question we address in this section is whether more explicit (strict) or transparent ITers di¤er from their more implicit ( ‡exible) or less transparent counterparts? To this end we retrieve panel data in annual frequency for 21 full- ‡edged ITers spanning the full course of in ‡ation targeting eras, including the stage of disin ‡ation. Before conducting the panel analysis, we plot average in ‡ation and average variation of in ‡ation over the full sample period against our ‡exibility and transparency indices for selected ITers. 13 Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that both transparency and ‡exibility are negatively associated with average in ‡ation. Figures 3 and 4 present the scatterplots between the variation of in ‡ation and transparency and ‡exibility. While the negative association between transparency and in ‡ation variation is salient in Figure 3 , the relationship for ‡exibility appears to be more quadratic. In addition to cross-section data plots, we test in the next subsection the validity of the newly minted indices.
A. The Validity of the Subindices on Flexibility and Transparency
We run parsimonious …xed e¤ects estimations of the following two equations using robust and clustering options and controlling for nonspherical errors. This in e¤ect down-weights sample outliers and gives White-corrected standard errors. it = y it = it + 1 F lexibility it + countrydummies + timedummies; it = y it = it + 1 T ransparency it + countrydummies + timedummies;
where it and y it are variations in in ‡ation and growth for country i at time t, derived from the standard deviation of the …ve-year rolling averages of in ‡ation and growth, respectively.
If the IT indices are well constructed, the relative variability of in ‡ation vis-a-vis growth should be smaller in a more transparent and more stringent IT regime, as the theory of IT would suggest. We thus expect to …nd a negative coe¢ cient on transparency and a positive one on ‡exibility. The transparency index indeed carries the expected negative sign (-1.79) and is signi…cant at the 1% level with a t-ratio of -2.96. Barring further re…nement of the index and the data on in ‡ation and growth variability, however, the ‡exibility index has a negative coe¢ cient -0.98 and is almost signi…cant at the 5% level with a t-ratio of -2.04, which is contrary to the prior. This points to the viability of the story that relatively credible and well-established ITers can a¤ord more ‡exibility such as an inde…nite horizon to bring in ‡ation back to target.
An alternative explanation might be that 15 countries in the sample have gone through disin ‡ation phases, in which in ‡ation variation is often large relative to growth variation due to the reduction of in ‡ation from double digits to single digits. 14 Rerunning the regression on the subsample consisting of postdisin ‡ation phases does lend partial support to this explanation. It yields a positive coe¢ cient 0.27, although not signi…cant with a t-ratio of 0.55, suggesting that high ‡exibility is indeed associated with large relative in ‡ation variability.
B. Does IT Matter? Is There an Optimal Degree of Flexibility or
Transparency?
Here we investigate in ‡ation dynamics, i.e., the mean (annual level), variance, and persistence of in ‡ation, among di¤erent types of ITers. We …rst …t simple …xed e¤ects estimation of the mean in ‡ation without including control variables X other than our own constructed IT indices.
where is the in ‡ation rate and X denotes the vector of other control variables.
Preliminary results indicate the following pattern: (1) both ‡exibility and transparency indices carry negative signs and are both signi…cant at the 1% level (see Table 5 speci…cations 1 and 5); and (2) the impact of ‡exibility is more quadratic, with the quadratic term almost signi…cant at 10% level; but transparency does not show signs of diminishing returns (see Table 5 speci…cations 2 and 6). This pattern of results also holds when we estimate a New Keynesian type Phillips curve after adding output gap and in ‡ation expectation, proxied by lagged in ‡ation, as controls (see Table 5 speci…cations 3 and 6).
The signi…cant negative sign of ‡exibility warrants further explanation as the theory of IT would indicate otherwise. As discussed in section 2, the negative correlation between ‡exibility and mean in ‡ation may simply re ‡ect the fact that well-established ITers, often with lower level of in ‡ation, can a¤ord more ‡exibility. We therefore regress reduction in in ‡ation on the ‡exibility index:
where it = it i;t 1 is the increase (negative of reduction) in in ‡ation. This returns a positive coe¢ cient 2.91 and is signi…cant at the 5% level with a t-ratio of 2.61, which con…rms the a priori that more stringency is associated with increasing in ‡ation reduction.
We now estimate the equation of in ‡ation variability:
where is the variation of in ‡ation and X denotes the vector of other control variables. The variation of growth is included as a control per the theory of in ‡ation-output variability trade-o¤ (Taylor, 1979) . The aforementioned pattern of results again holds (see Table 6 speci…cations [1] [2] [3] . Note that the e¤ects of transparency become even more pronounced (signi…cant at the 1% level) in reducing in ‡ation variation.
An intriguing …nding emerges from …tting the New Keynesian Phillips curve with added ‡exibility index and its squared term. The relevant coe¢ cients (Table 5 speci…cations 3 and 4) suggest that the optimal degree of ‡exibility (F lexibility ) lies around 0.7. This number is derived from …rst order conditions as F lexibility = 1 =2 2 . It corresponds to the ‡exibility index of IT frontier countries such as Canada (after 1995), Chile (after 2001), New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden (see Table 3 ).
C. A Horse Race Between Di¤erent IT Components
We now run a horse race between the two important components of the IT index: ‡exibility and transparency. Both indices are included in the same equations for estimating the mean in ‡ation and variation of in ‡ation.
In the mean in ‡ation equation, ‡exibility is no longer signi…cant, but transparency remains signi…cant at the 1% level (Table 5 speci…cation 7 ). In the in ‡ation variation equation (Table 6 speci…cation 3) , transparency continues to be signi…cant at the 1% level and with expected negative sign; but ‡exibility turns barely signi…cant at the 10% level. The sharp contrast demonstrates that all that matters in the aggregate IT index is transparency and accountability. 15 The ultimate question is not so much the label of IT as the substance on these important dimensions.
IV. Robustness Checks A. Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
We have been assigning subjective and mostly equal weights to di¤erent components of the ‡exibility and transparency indices of in ‡ation targeting. For example, the weight somewhat arbitrarily given to target horizon is equal to that of target range and to the combined weight of reporting requirements and escape clauses. There is nonetheless a possibility that certain attributes may be more important than others. Target horizon, for instance, may carry more weight than is assigned given that escape clauses and reporting requirements are seldom invoked and target range is not always binding.
One alternative to adjust for the subjectivity of constructing an index is to let the data decide relative weights. Factor analysis (e.g., Watson 1989, 2002; Bai and Ng, 2002) enables us to detect the most important components of IT while automatically correcting for potential multicollinearity among the di¤erent attributes of the indices. The resulting factors, the principal components, are latent variables that are linear combinations of di¤erent underlying attributes. The factor loadings associated with the linear combinations will be alternative weights for the newly constructed indices. Banaian, Burdekin, and Willett (1998) used PCA to examine the role played by 15 of the attributes of central bank independence in the Cukierman index. They found that most appear to have an insigni…cant or a positive rather than a negative relationship with mean in ‡ation rates.
To conduct the factor analysis, we re…ne the indices and include annual observations on the following nine attributes: target range, target horizon, reporting requirements, escape clauses, number of in ‡ation reports, forecasts, fan charts, central bank website coverage, and central bank independence. Three eigenvalues of the correlation matrix are greater than one (see the screeplot in Figure 5 ). The scree test associated with the plot also suggests that the optimal number of common factors is three. We thus retain three principal components, with each one uncorrelated to any other.
The …rst principal component (Z 1 ) is the one that matters most and is usually referred to as the "general" factor. The factor loadings associated with Z 1 are the weights. It is noticeable that roughly equal weights are assigned to di¤erent underlying attributes except for reporting requirements and escape clauses (see Table 7 ). The sum of the loadings (in absolute terms) of these two items, however, is almost equal to that of other attributes, especially those of target horizon and target range. This coincides with our a priori assumption in assigning only half weights to these two attributes in constructing the ‡exibility subindex.
Regressing both the level and the variation of in ‡ation on Z 1; Z 2; Z 3 , and a full set of country dummies, we …nd that only Z 1 is signi…cant at the 5% level and carries the expected negative sign (see Table 8 ). Not surprisingly, all the explanatory power resides with the …rst principal component. The drawback with the PCA, however, is that components other than the …rst, e.g., Z 2; Z 3 , are usually hard to interpret. Thus it might be preferable to work with some related and yet more interpretable variables, F 0 s, that are linear combinations of the Z 0 s. F 0 s become more interpretable in the sense that each F is highly correlated to a speci…c subset of the underlying attributes. We can therefore employ the "orthogonal rotation" technique and construct three new factors, each signi…cantly associated with certain underlying attributes and yet not correlated with one another.
The factor loadings associated with the three rotated components F 1; F 2; and F 3; and the correlation coe¢ cients between these components and the nine underlying attributes of IT are reported in Tables 9 and 10 . It is noticeable that the No.1 factor is mostly signi…cantly correlated with the following three attributes in the transparency subindex, e.g., number of in ‡ation reports, quantitative forecasts, and publication of fan charts.
Using the rotated components F 1; F 2; and F 3 as regressors and including country …xed e¤ects and other controls, we …nd that F 1 is signi…cantly and negatively associated with both the level and the variation of in ‡ation across di¤erent speci…cations (see Table 11 ). The rotated factor F 3 , which is predominantly correlated with central bank website coverage, is also signi…cantly and negatively associated with the variation of in ‡ation (Table 11 speci…cations 3 and 4).
B. Subsampling
As a further robustness check, we divide the full sample of 21 ITers into two groups. The …rst consists of 13 emerging market economies; the second is composed of 8 industrial countries. The same pattern of results as highlighted in section 3 holds in the subsample of emerging market economies, but not in the group of industrial countries (Table 12) . This contrast of results should not be too surprising since the di¤erences of IT practices among emerging economies are much larger than those among industrial countries. Noticeable intragroup heterogeneity withstanding, it is worth emphasizing that there is an even larger intergroup di¤erence in terms of ‡exibility and transparency. The intergroup heterogeneity also explains the signi…cant deterioration of the goodness-of-…t in the two subsamples compared to the full sample. Precisely because of both the intergroup and the intragroup heterogeneity, however, the search for attributes of successful in ‡ation targeting becomes even more meaningful.
Another caveat is that some ITers (15 of 21) have gone through the process of disin ‡ation while moving toward de jure or more full- ‡edged IT. To control for potential confounding e¤ects due to disin ‡ation, we add a dummy variable indicating the phase of disin ‡ation. It aims to test the robustness of our story of the irrelevance of ‡exibility and the importance of transparency in a subsample closer to a natural experiment. The results (Table 13) indicate that, after controlling for disin ‡ation, transparency remains signi…cant in reducing in ‡ation variation across both subsamples and the full sample.
C. Endogeneity
The estimates of the impact of transparency might be subject to endogeneity bias. So might the results for ‡exibility, although the sources of endogeneity could di¤er. For ‡exibility, potential endogeneity might be due to simultaneity or reverse causality. A signi…cant and positive association between in ‡ation dynamics and ‡exibility can be observed among stable ITers. It can be interpreted either as that ‡exibility leads to superior performance of in ‡ation dynamics; or, the other way around, that superior track record compensates for the potential credibility loss from increased ‡exibility. For transparency, the sources are more likely to be omitted variables or unobservables relegated to the error term. To account for the possibility of an endogeneity problem due to either reverse causality or omitted variables, we run two-stage least-squares ( The error terms in the …rst and second-stage regressions are v and u respectively. X is a set of included exogenous variables, meaning they are exogenous variables that are included in second-stage regressions. Instruments, often dubbed excluded exogenous variables, are adopted to extract the exogenous components of the ‡exibility and transparency index. Notice that included exogenous variables X can be part of the instruments, but the instruments should have at least one variable that is exogenous and excluded from the second-stage regression.
Potential instruments for ‡exibility include in ‡ation history (10-year lagged in ‡ation), neighbors' ‡exibility, and political economy aspects of central bank operation. Promising instruments for transparency include education (tertiary school enrollment rate), development of stock markets (10-year lagged market capitalization as a percent of GDP), and neighbors'transparency. Current education level and lagged stock market development are chosen because of the plausible thesis that the more educated the public and the more advanced the …nancial markets, the more pressure there will be on central banks to be transparent. 16 Neighbors'transparency and ‡exibility are also potential instruments because they are unlikely to be correlated with omitted variables of a foreign country and yet very likely in ‡uenced by a neighboring country's in ‡ation targeting practice due to peer pressure or spillover e¤ects. In fact, we do observe clustering of IT and similar degrees of transparency and ‡exibility among "neighbors" (see Tables 3 and  4 Table 14 . The proposed instruments for transparency appear to be valid as the null hypothesis can't be rejected at the 5% signi…cance level. 17 The extracted exogenous component of transparency remains signi…cant in reducing both the variation and the level of in ‡ation in virtually all speci…cations. It still retains the expected negative sign in the one speci…cation that it is not signi…cant. Comparing the coe¢ cients of transparency in Table  14 with those from corresponding speci…cations in Tables 5, 6 , and 13, it appears that the instrumental variable estimation actually strengthens the magnitude of the impact of transparency. Corresponding Hausman tests, however, fall short of proving that the di¤erences are statistically signi…cant. 18
V. Avenues for Future Research and Re ‡ections A. The Credibility and Flexibility Trade-o¤
A potential trade-o¤ with in ‡ation targeting, as previously mentioned, is that with increased ‡exibility there is more risk of losing credibility. Less ‡exibility (more stringency) is often desirable during disin ‡ation phases for the sake of establishing credibility and thus well-anchored in ‡ation. However, the other side of the same coin is that with credibility well-established, central banks can a¤ord and often desire more ‡exibility in taking other objectives into account. As is observable in the data, target horizons tend to lengthen when in ‡ation stabilizes; whereas annual target horizons are commonly used in disin ‡ation. To put it di¤erently, central banks with well-established IT regimes may face di¤erent credibility and ‡exibility trade-o¤ curves. Follow-up research might plot the track record of meeting targets, a proxy of credibility, against our constructed ‡exibility index and ascertain whether there is indeed a trade-o¤, and whether ITers at di¤erent stages are facing di¤erent trade-o¤ curves. 1 7 Proposed instruments for ‡exibility, e.g., 10-year lagged in ‡ation and neighbors' ‡exibility, also can't be rejected under the OIR-tests. However, they appear to be weak instruments and fail to reject the null in both the weak identi…cation and the underidenti…cation tests across di¤erent regression speci…cations. The results are thus not reported here but are available upon request. 1 8 The Hausman test has as its null hypothesis p lim( OLS 2SLS ) = 0 and the test statistic H is calculated as H = ( OLS 2SLS ) 2 (S:E:( 2SLS )) 2 (S:E:( OLS )) 2 . Under the null hypothesis, H follows a Chi-square distribution with degree of freedom one. The test results should be taken with great caution for two reasons. First, the Hausman test often has a low power as there is no explicit alternative hypothesis. Second, it may be subject to the "small sample" problem here due to limited number of observations.
B. Final Re ‡ections
What is IT? And why move to IT? For the U.S. and some others, the question is whether moving to full- ‡edged in ‡ation targeting would matter much for the conduct and performance of monetary policy. Put di¤erently, is announcing a target and having a single/hierarchical mandate really necessary for well-anchored in ‡ation expectation? The Fed's current regime appears to have successfully obtained one of the most important bene…ts ascribed to a regime based on explicit guidelines. U.S. …nancial markets and the public do not seem to be overly bothered by the lack of an explicit number, and in ‡ationary expectations are well anchored. 19 For emerging ITers, the question is di¤erent, but similar policy implications can be drawn from the …ndings of this study. If, as we have demonstrated, the ultimate hallmark that di¤erentiates a more successful ITer from its less successful counterpart is the subindex of transparency and accountability, then the ultimate question is not so much the label of IT as the substance of increased central bank transparency and accountability.
VI. Appendices A. Appendix 1 -Factor Analysis
Let X it be the observed data for the ith cross-section unit at time t, for i = 1; :::; N , and t = 1; :::; T . Consider the following factor representation of data:
F jt = F jt 1 + u t where ij is a factor loading coe¢ cient associated with factor F jt .
The number of common factors k is estimated by solving the following optimization problem:
2 s:t:F 0 F=T 2 = I k 1 9 Blinder and Reis (2005) , among others, hinted that in ‡ation targeting might institutionalize monetary policy decision-making and thus overcome reliance on personality. Other potential bene…ts of moving to full‡edged IT include that IT changes the dynamics of in ‡ation and this change of dynamics can't be otherwise achieved in a non-IT or implicit IT regime.
-20 -where F is the vector of common factors, F t = (F 1t ; F 2t ; :::; F kt ), = ( 1 ; 2 ; :::; N ) 0 , and 0 i = ( i1 ; i2 ; :::; ik ).
In deciding the optimal number of common factors, we can employ criteria involving penalty functions proposed by Bai and Ng (2002) . The column components of the 0 matrix are the estimated eigenvectors corresponding to the k largest eigenvalues of the T N matrix XX 0 .
Once the number of common factors and the eigenvalues are identi…ed, we restrict ourselves to those components that are associated with an eigenvalue greater than one. We then regress this subset of factors against the mean and variance of in ‡ation in the sample. As a next step, we back out the attributes of IT indices from the common factors and re-estimate the equations of mean and variance of in ‡ation. 
